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SURETYSHIP
DISCHARGE OF SURETY - RELEASE OF JUDGMENT AGAINST
PRINCIPAL WITH RESERVATION OF RIGHTS AGAINST
SURETY
Plaintiff leased real estate for ten years to defendant, who after five
years assigned the lease to G. G assumed covenants therein to pay rent
and not to commit waste, but plaintiff did not release defendant from
the same obligation. At the expiration of the lease plaintiff recovered
against defendant and G separate judgments for $2844.75 for breaches
of the covenants. Pursuant to a contract with G that on payment of
$2000 plaintiff would "satisfy" his judgment against G, but "was not
[thereby] to release any legal right.., to enforce his ... judgment"
against defendant, plaintiff on such payment gave a receipt for "full
satisfaction of the judgment" against G, but "not to release any legal
right" to enforce the judgment against defendant. The terms of such
contract were journalized in the action against G, recording the satisfac-
tion of the judgment. Now plaintiff brings suit to collect his judgment
against defendant from after-acquired property. From an affirmance
in the Court of Appeals of a judgment for plaintiff based on Ohio Gen.
Code, Sec. 8084, a motion to certify was allowed. Held, that, since after
assignment of a lease the lessee becomes surety to the lessor for the obliga-
tion of the assignee assuming the covenants therein, Sections 8079-8084,
precluding release of one joint debtor by settlement with another, are
inapplicable; that the reservation of rights against defendant in the release
is ineffective because, the judgment against G having been unqualifiedly
discharged in full, the rights of the lessee-surety against the assignee-
principal were not thereby reserved; and that the release of the obligation
to pay the greater, liquidated amount on receipt of the lesser sum is bind-
ing because either consideration exists therefor or, if not, such transaction
is executed. Judgment reversed and final judgment for appellant.
Cullen v. Schmit, 137 Ohio St. 479, 30 N.E. (2) 994 (1940); Baker v. Frazier, 137 Ohio
St. 479, 30 N. E. (2d) 994 (1940); Mosey v. Hiestand, 138 Ohio St. 249, 34 N.E. (2d)
210 ('941); Schultz v. Killmer, 138 Ohio St. 249, 34 N.E. (2d) Z1o (94)i cf. Bett-
man v. Northern Insurance Co., 13+ Ohio St. 341, 16 N.E. (2d) 472 (938), overruling,
Hall v. Hall, SS Ohio App. 67, 8 N.E. (zd) 58Z (1936)i The State, Ex Rel. Squire v.
Winch, 137 Ohio St. 479, 30 N.E. (zd) 994 (1940), overruling, The First National
Bank v. The Kittoe Boiler & Tank Co., 62 Ohio App. 411, 24 N.E. (2d) 458 (1939)i
Couk v. The Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., Ltd., 138 Ohio St. 110, 33 N.E. (2d)
9 (1941), overruling, Cultice v. DeMaro Realty Co., 29 Ohio L. Abs. S66 (939);
i& Re Trusteeship of Stone, 138 Ohio St. 293, - N.E. (2d) - (1941) (reversing on
merits).
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Weygandt, C. J. and Zimmerman, J. dissented. Gholson v. Savin, 137
Ohio St. 551, 31 N.E. (2d) 858 (1941).
The lessee was not discharged of his obligation under the covenants
of the lease, no agreement of the lessor to accept the liability of the
assignee in place of that of the lessee existing.1 But by assuming the
covenants the assignee came under the same obligation as that of the
lessee to the lessor, who was thereby made the beneficiary of a third
party beneficiary contract,' if manifesting acceptance thereof.' Although
thereby the lessee and assignee were both primarily liable to the lessor,
since the whole benefit of the contract was taken by the assignee, the
lessee becomes surety for him.'
But to affect the lessor-creditor with this change of relationship
modifies his rights because to have the primary and original obligation of
two principal debtors is very different from having the primary obliga-
tion of one as principal debtor and of another only as surety therefor.
Consequently Ohio Courts have held that in the assumption-of-mortgage-
by-assignee cases the liability of the first promisor-mortgagor still remains
an original and principal obligation with respect to the creditor-
mortgagee.5
But the present case is not one of non-consensual suretyship, although
the surety relationship was created after the lessee was already bound
'Taylor v. DeBus, 31 Ohio St. 468 (1877); Poe v. Dixon, 6o Ohio St. z4, 54
N.E. 86 (I899); see RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) Secs. 427, 428 (requirements of
novation) and Onio ANNOT. (933) Secs. 427, 428.
2 Emmitt v. Brophy, 42 Ohio St. 82 (1884).
3The Community Discount & Mortgage Co. v. Joseph, 217 Ohio St. 127, 157 N.E.
380 (19z7); Motz v. Root, 53 Ohio App. 375, 4 N.E. (zd) 990 (934.)i c. Harmony
Lodge v. White, 30 Ohio St. 569 (1876).
'Sutliff v. Atwood, 25 Ohio St. 186 (1864); McHenry v. Carson, 41 Ohio St. 2x2
(1884); Poe v. Dixon, 6o Ohio St. 124, 54 N.E. 86 (2899) (mortgage); The Columbus
Gas & Fuel Co. v. The Knox County Oil & Gas Co., 92 Ohio St. 35, 2o9 N.E. 529 (I924);
Walser v. Farmers Trust Co., zz6 Ohio St. 367, 185 N.E. 535 (1933) (mortgage).
GTeeters v. Lamborn, 43 Ohio St. i44, 1 N.E. 513 (1885); Denison University v.
Manning, 65 Ohio St. 138, 61 N.E. 7o6 (i9oi) (otherwise novation exists); Cone v.
Rees, is Ohio C.C. 632 (1896) (not shown creditor knew of suretyship relation); The
Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Menke, 45 Ohio App. 122, 186 N.E. 745 (193z);
Torrey v. Stevenson, 2 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 445 (29o4); cf. Richards v. The Market
Exchange Bank Company, 81 Ohio St. 348, 9o N.E. ooo (i92o); Washer v. Tontar,
28 Ohio St. iii, 29o N.E. z31 (1934) (same, based on N.I.L.). But cf. Goodman v.
Goodman, 127 Ohio St. 223, 287 N.E. 777 (1933)i see 22z A.L.R. 1324, 1331-32 (Ohio
is minority rule); Note, Suretyship Releases in The Law of Mortgages (1937) 4 U. Cut.
L. REV. 469; (2928) 2z MINN. L. REv. 668; (1928) 26 Mic. L. REV. 929; (1933)
ix N.C.L. REv. 96; (1935) 13 N.C.L. RV. 337; cf. (2933) 81 U. PA. L.REv. 642;
(1936) 22 VA. L. REv. 964; (1937) 10 So. CALIF. L. Rv. 52o Stevens, Extension
Agreements in the "Subject-To" Mortgage Situation (2942) 25 U. Ci. L. RV. 58;
see Berick, Personal Liability For Deficiency in Mortgage Foreclosures (1934) 8 U. CN.
L. REv. 103, 131-134.
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as a principal obligor to the lessor.' Mere knowledge of the assignment
of the lease or assent thereto, manifested by treating the assignee as an
obligor, accepting rent from him, while not enough to create a full
novation, may be enough to make the lessee's obligation to the lessor
now only that of surety, a limited novation.' To the extent that the
lessor-creditor after the assignment must treat the lessee only as surety
for the assignee, the present case reverses the prior rule in the assump-
tion of mortgage cases, as no difference between the two-mortgage or
lease-in this respect appears.
Since the relationship of principal and surety exists, at least between
lessee and assignee, it seems immaterial whether Ohio Gen. Code, Sec-
tions 8079-8084, so limiting the effect of a release given to one debtor
as not to discharge other "joint debtors," apply only to joint or joint
and several promisors or whether these provisions apply to obligors
between whom such suretyship relation exists. A release to one joint
and several promisor does not discharge the several duties of the others.'
The Court held that the statute, applying "only in cases where the
codebtors are each liable in the same right for the payment of the whole
obligation, and where, as a consequence, the right of contribution exists
between them," is inoperative here where the assignee as "principal
debtor owes the whole debt as between himself and his surety," the
lessee.' But, even if Sections 8079-8084 were applicable, Section 8082
would result in the discharge of the lessee-surety. Section 8082 provides
that "the discharge of such partner [or joint debtor by Section 8084]
shall be deemed a payment to the creditor equal to the proportionate
interest of the partner [debtor] discharged . . .", meaning, as applied to
"other joint debtors," "equal to the proportionate" amount of such
obligor's ultimate liability for the debt,"0 which liability the assignee bears.
Thus since the "proportionate interest of the ... [debtor] discharged"
is the whole of the obligation of the covenants, "the discharge of such...
[debtor] shall be deemed a payment to the creditor equal to" the whole
of the obligation and nothing will be left thereof to charge the lessee-
surety. In the reverse case a release of a surety is payment of no'part of
'See Campbell, Non-Conscnsual Suretyship (1935) 45 YALE L. J. 69 (when no
understanding between two obligors as to who should bear ultimate burden).
7See REAsrATEsNT, SFcURrvI (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1940) Sees. 113, comment a,
iiS, comment b; cf. Templeton v. Shakley, 107 Pa. 370 (1884) (creditor need not know
obligor is surety to give latter suretyship defenses); American Blower Company v. Lion
Bonding & Surety Co. 178 Iowa 1304, z6o N.W. 939 (197) (or even of existence of
rurety).
'See RES$TATEmENT, CONTRACTS (1932) Sec. 5z3 (making resort to Sees. 8079-8o84
unnecessary, "except in cases and to the extent required by the law of suretyship").
'Cf. Slatoff v. Theurich, 123 N.J. Eq. 593, 199 Ati. 49 (1938) (in equity).
1 Cf. Walsh v. Miller, 51 Ohio St. 462, 38 N.E. 38 (894).
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the debt, except what is actually received in return for the release, since
the surety has no ultimate "proportionate interest" in the obligation."
Although the lessor-creditor cannot obtain the benefits of Sections
8079-8o84 in enforcing his obligation against the lessee-surety, if
release of the assignee as principal debtor on partial paymenf of the
judgment is such a normal way of collecting the judgment frbm an
insolvent principal debtor as to be within the contemplation of the parties
when the suretyship obligation was assumed, such obligation of the lessee-
surety should remain unaffected.' 2 Should the lessee-surety have expected
this? But release of the principal debtor before performance is due will
insure that such performance will not be forthcoming. The loss is
caused by the obligee's own act, the risk of which a surety does not
ordinarily undertake and the latter is thereby discharged. 3 The creditor's
release of real security is likewise ordinarily not within the surety's
expectation of the risk assumed.' 4 A surety is entitled to be subrogated
to such security-the judgment of the lessor against the assignee in the
present case--on payment of the obligation.' This right is more valuable
than the direct-action of indemnity or reimbursement."
Although the assignee-principal debtor may have been insolvent at
the time of the release, a judgment surviving against him is a basis to
assert a lien on his after-acquired property, the remedy sought against
the lessee in the present case. By an effective release of the judgment
the lessee-surety on payment is deprived of such remedy. Releasing the
judgment then might be said not to have been contemplated as part of
the lessee-surety's risk. Regardless of intent of the parties, if the judg-
ment against the principal debtor is released, the traditional rule-that the
right of subrogation is impaired, if the surety can no longer enforce such
judgment--discharges him to the extent of the value of such security.
Here the reservation of rights against the lessee-surety was held not to
'Cf. Harris v. De Paulina, 40 Ohio App. 57, 178 N.E. zz5 (193), (193z) 1o
TENN. L. REV. 140. After the discussion of the applicability of Secs. 8079-8084 the Court
had no help on the other issues decided from the briefs filed.
"See ARANT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY (93) 183,
i9i-i912 cf. Crawford v. Swearingen, i5 Ohio 265 (1846), Woolworth v. Brinker,
ii Ohio St. 593 (x86o). But cf. Anthony v. Capel, 53 Miss. 350 (1876)i Banana Sales
Corp. v. Chuchanis, i 9g Ohio St. 75, x6z N.E. 274 (1928).
'Compare The Trustees v. Miller, 3 Ohio z61 (1827), with Rock v. Monarch
Building Company, 87 Ohio St. 2 20oo N.E. 887 (19z), The United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. v. The Allied Products Co., 45 Ohio App. 270, 187 N.E. 83 (2933).
"Arant, Why Release of Security Discharges a Surety (2930) 24 MINN. L. REv.
725; ARANT, op. cit. supra note 2, at 219-238; Cf. Hochevar v. Maryland Casualty Co.,
224 F. (zd) 948 (C.C.A. 6th, x94o).
'SHill v. King, 48 Ohio St. 75, 26 N.E. 988 (1892)i cf. Neal v. Nash, 23 Ohio
St. 483 (1872); Zuellig v. Hemerlie, 6o Ohio St. 27, 53 N.E. 447 (1899); City of
Toledo v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 46 Ohio App. 97, i87 N.E. 790 (1933).
"Cf. Nelson v. Webster, 72 Neb. 332, 2o N.W. 412 (1904).
NOTES AND COMMENTS 467
have prevented complete discharge and satisfaction of such judgment.
Hence the release impaired the right of subrogation. Although. heretofore
harmonizing the conflicting intents expressed in a release of the principal
debtor with a reservation of rights against the surety has resulted in a
covenant not to sue, which, not preventing suit in the creditor's name,
does not impair the right of subrogation,"7 yet in the principal case the
intent was considered clear to give a complete discharge of the judgment
against the assignee-principal obligor. Preserving to the surety only the
direct right of reimbursement would not seem to be enough when, as
here, the right of subrogation is better. Conversely, had no judgment
existed, a release merely of the obligation of the assignee-principal with
the same reservation might not have discharged the lessee-surety. Ai-
though equity could revive the creditor's judgment against the principal
for the benefit of the surety on payment, such action would nullify the
express release given the assignee-principal debtor.' But a careful lawyer
can still draw a release with reservation of rights that will be effective
against a surety in Ohio. 9
Finally, since the right of subrogation is not impaired if the release
is not so binding that the creditor, and hence the surety when subrogated,
is prevented from enforcing his judgment against the principal debtor,
the Court was required to find some consideration for the release of the
larger, liquidated amount-$2844.75-upon payment of the smaller-
$2000.20 But this rule of the sufficiency of consideration has been modi-
fied.' Thus consideration was found in an application of a bird-in-the-
hand-is-worth-two-in-the-bush policy. Furthermore, performance and
execution of a transaction here will not be undone. The fact that the
contract of release was carried into the journal entry, satisfying the
judgment against the assignee, and thereby made part of the court record
gave the transaction such an air of solemnity that the policy underlying
the doctrine of consideration was satisfied. C. B. B., JR.
" See 4 WILLIsTON, THE LAw OF CONTCrCS (rev. ed. 1936) Sec. 1230.
"See CAMPBELL, Protection Against Indirect Attack in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS
01934) 3-4-
"See Gholson v. Savin, supra at pp. 56o-x; cf. The Adams Express Co. v. Beck-
with, xoo Ohio St. 348, 1z6 N.E. 300 (1919), overruling, Ellis v. Bitzer, 2 Ohio 89
(iSzS). Compare Losito v. Kruse, Jr. 136 Ohio St. 183, 24 N.E. (2d) 705 (1940), with
Herron v. City of Youngstown, 136 Ohio St. i9o, 24 N.E. (zd) 7o8 (1940).
'"Se REsrAT ENT, CONTRACTS (1932) Sec. 76 (c); cf. Turnbull v. Brock, 31 Ohio
St. 649 (1877).
aCf. Harper v. Graham, 2o Ohio so6 (iSi); Adams Recreation Palace, Inc. v.
Griffith, S8 Ohio App. zx6, 16 N.E. (zd) 489 (1937), (1938) 5 O.S.L.J. 115, (939)
13 U. Cs. L. REv. 4965 see VRIGHTu, Ought the Doctrine of Consideration to be Abol-
ished from the Common Law? (1936) 49 HARv. L. REv. zz25; Ohio Gen. Code, Secs.
8079-8084 and REsTATE-mENT, CONTRACTS, OHIO ANNOT. (1933) Sec. 121; 119 A.L.R.
I12. But cf. Schaefer v. The First National Bank, 134 Ohio St. 5xx, 18 N.E. (zd) 263
(1938), (939) 52 HARV. L. Rrv. 687.
